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INTRODUCTION 
New York courts have long embraced a posture of considerable judicial 
restraint when passing upon the coordinating branches’ determinations of 
blight in eminent domain cases.  Notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s controversial 2005 pronouncement in Kelo v. City of New London,1 
after which forty-three states heeded the majority’s invitation to refine their 
own laws to more strenuously protect private property rights,2 New York’s 
government-permissive statutory scheme and solicitous judicial response 
remains unchanged.  As recently as the last judicial term, the New York 
 
* Peter W. Rodino Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School.  The author thanks participants 
in the Fordham Urban Law Journal symposium on takings law for their helpful insights and 
comments, and Jennifer Bennett, Paolo Bruno, and Javier Diaz for their invaluable research 
assistance. 
 1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 2. Justice Stevens, the architect of the majority’s ruling in Kelo, later viewed favorably 
“the public outcry that greeted Kelo,” observing in a speech to a county bar association that 
the backlash itself “is some evidence that the political process is up to the task of address-
ing” eminent domain reform. Justice John Paul Stevens, Judicial Predilections, Address to 
the Clark County Bar Ass’n (Aug. 18, 2005), in 6 NEV. L.J. 1, 4 (2005). 
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Court of Appeals, in Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp.3 
and Goldstein v. Pataki,4 concluded that the Empire State Development 
Corporation’s (ESDC’s) findings of blight must stand, unless patently irra-
tional or baseless.5 
In Kaur, the court afforded wholesale deference to the legislative body’s 
characterization of relevant parts of West Harlem as “substantially unsafe, 
unsanitary, substandard, and deteriorated,”6 notwithstanding the fact that 
those characterizations rested in considerable part on the machinations of 
the very enterprise—Columbia University—that would stand to gain from 
the blight designation.  The blight characterization inspired a host of voci-
ferous objections.7  Nonetheless, the court deemed firm and immutable the 
premise that the judicial branch must not substitute its judgment for that of 
the legislatively designated agency. 
Similarly, in Goldstein, the Atlantic Yards case, New York’s highest 
court endorsed the condemnation of a residential community to make way 
for a “mixed-use development” that was proposed by private developer 
Forest City Ratner Companies (FCRC) for the benefit of that developer.8  
The exercise of eminent domain would allow for the construction of a 
 
 3. 933 N.E.2d 721, 731 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. 
State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 4. 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 5. See id.; see also Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 
(N.Y. 2009). 
 6. Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 726. 
 7. See id. at 727; see also Maggie Astor & Kim Kirschenbaum, Court OKs Manhattan-
ville Expansion, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR, June 24, 2010, available at http://www.columbia 
spectator.com/2010/06/24/court-oks-expansion; Kim Kirschenbaum, Harlem Activists Seek 
Eminent Domain Law Reform, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR, Oct. 18, 2010, available at http://ww 
w.columbiaspectator.com/2010/10/18/harlem-activists-seek-eminent-domain-law-reform; 
Kim Kirschenbaum, Property Holdouts Look to Supreme Court, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR, 
Sept. 22, 2010, available at http://www.columbiaspectator.com/2010/09/22/property-hold 
outs-look-supreme-court; More on Last Week’s Decision in Columbia Eminent Domain 
Case, EMINENT DOMAIN LAW BLOG (June 29, 2010), http://ownerscounsel.blogspot. 
com/2010/06/more-on-last-weeks-decision-in-columbia.html; Damon W. Root, Judicial Re-
view of Eminent Domain in New York is Fundamentally Broken, REASON.COM (June 25, 
2010), http://reason.com/blog/2010/06/25/judicial-review-of-eminent-dom; Robert Thomas, 
New York Still Has “Unfrozen Caveman Judges” Who Are “Frightened and Confused” by 
Eminent Domain Blight, INVERSECONDEMNATION (June 24, 2010), http://www.inverse 
condemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2010/06/new-york-still-has-unfrozen-caveman-
judges-who-are-frightened-and-confused-by-blight.html; Robert Thomas, There Really Are 
No Limits To Eminent Domain In New York—Court Of Appeals Reverses The Columbia 
Case (Kaur), INVERSECONDEMNATION (June 24, 2010), http://www.inversecondemnation. 
com/inversecondemnation/2010/06/there-really-are-no-limits-to-eminent-domain-in-new-
york-court-of-appeals-reverses-the-columbia-case.html; Jonathan S. Torbin, New York’s 
Eminent Domain “Blight” Grows, COMMENTARY MAGAZINE (June 24, 2010), 
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/tobin/319631. 
 8. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 166, 175. 
FRANZESE_CHRISTENSEN 6/7/2011  7:01 PM 
2011] THE PROMISE OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 1093 
sports arena to house the NBA Nets franchise.9  The court of appeals noted 
that affected private property owners were “doubtless correct that the con-
ditions cited in support of the blight finding at issue do not begin to ap-
proach in severity the dire circumstances of urban slum dwelling de-
scribed” in earlier court precedent.10  Still, the court chose to defer whole-
wholesale to the agency’s determination of blight, concluding that once the 
legislative agency has made its findings, absent a showing of corruption or 
irrationality, “there is nothing for the courts to do about it.”11 
New York’s expansive approach to government’s eminent domain pow-
ers is manifested in the generous two-fold classification process that its sta-
tutory scheme allows.  Under the New York State Urban Development 
Corporation Act (UDCA), a government agency may justify a taking of 
private property if the property is determined to have fallen prey to 
“blight,” or, in the alternative, if the land will be used in a manner that can 
support its classification as a “civic project.”12  Blight designations are rea-
dily affirmed, as courts routinely defer to agency determinations.  In the 
rare instance that the agency is unable to demonstrate blight, the civic pur-
pose classification serves as a catch-all, effectively assuring that the exer-
cise of eminent domain will go forward.  Kaur makes plain the extent of 
the New York judiciary’s disinclination to enter the fray.13  There, the court 
afforded the agency’s blight designation wholesale deference while simul-
taneously declining to disturb its subsidiary determination that the taking 
for a private educational institution, Columbia University, qualified as a va-
lid “civic project.”14 
This Article asserts that the New York model must be recast to more ef-
fectively balance and vindicate the various equities that pit private property 
rights against concerns for the greater good.  In considerable measure, rein-
vention depends on the capacity of the courts to emerge as more meaning-
ful participants in the colloquy between and among the coordinating 
branches of government.  The Kaur case in particular provides an object 
lesson on the potential for abuse when agency determinations of blight are 
 
 9. Id. at 166. 
 10. Id. at 171; see also N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936) (devel-
oping the blight exception to the public use doctrine). 
 11. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172 (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 661 
(N.Y. 1953)). 
 12. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW, Ch. 252, tit. 16, ch. 24, subch. 1, §§ 6251-6292 (McKinney 
2010). 
 13. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied 
sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 14. Id. at 733. 
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allowed to rest, unchecked, on the machinations of the enterprise that is ad-
vancing that designation in the first place.15 
In the Kaur matter, Columbia University spent the better part of a dec-
ade quietly buying up considerable properties that would come to be within 
the scope of its proposed expansion, only to then allow those properties to 
fall into disrepair.16  As the New York Appellate Division noted angrily, 
“Manhattanville or West Harlem as a matter of record was not in a de-
pressed economic condition when EDC and ESDC embarked on their Co-
lumbia-prepared-and-financed quest.”17  Specifically, after purchasing or 
acquiring control of the properties in the designated area—vacating seven-
teen buildings and more than half of the tenants—Columbia let water infil-
tration conditions deteriorate, building code violations persist, and garbage 
and debris remain in certain buildings.18  In turn, the decay of those pre-
mises was used to substantiate the designation of blight.19 
The appellate division ruling in the Kaur case certainly appreciated the 
irony of such a result.  In what the court perceived to be evidence of agency 
bias in favor of Columbia, the court observed that the ESDC delayed mak-
ing an inquiry into the substandard conditions in Manhattanville until well 
after Columbia obtained control over the properties. The court found more 
evidence of agency heavy-handedness in the ESDC’s authorization of a 
special methodology, slanted in Columbia’s favor, for determining blight.20  
The court made plain its displeasure: “Even a cursory examination of the 
study reveals the idiocy of considering things like unpainted block walls or 
loose awning supports as evidence of a blighted neighborhood.  Virtually 
every neighborhood in the five boroughs will yield similar instances of dis-
repair . . . .”21  Still, on appeal, the court allowed the blight designation to 
stand.22 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11-15, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009) (“It is important to note that the record before ESDC contains no evidence whatsoever 
that Manhattanville was blighted prior to Columbia gaining control over the vast majority of 
property therein.”), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-
Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 17. Id. at 19 (noting that the 2002 West Harlem Master Plan stated that “not only was 
Harlem experiencing a renaissance of economic development, but that the area had great 
development potential that could easily be realized through rezoning”). 
 18. Id. at 17. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 21-22.  Columbia had hired an environmental and planning consulting firm, 
Allee, King, Rosen and Fleming, Inc. (AKRF) to assist in the planning.  The methodology 
employed narrowed AKRF’s investigation to highlight blight designations in the report. 
 21. Id. at 22 (alteration in original). 
 22. Id. at 24. 
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If the public trust is to be upheld, a more meaningful standard of judicial 
review must be applied to New York’s eminent domain process.  Part I of 
this Article sets forth the relevant doctrinal and procedural predicates help-
ful to an assessment of such a possibility.  It examines the mechanisms by 
which New York government agencies must abide when exercising the 
power of eminent domain.  Further, it introduces the relevant provisions of 
New York’s Eminent Domain Procedural Law (EDPL)23 as well as the 
UDCA, and sets the framework for a comparative approach.  Part II ex-
plores the devolution of the blight designation in New York into a stan-
dardless standard.  Against this backdrop, Part III critically considers the 
New York courts’ reluctance to second-guess state agency determinations 
of blight.  It examines the potential for abuse that a posture of wholesale 
judicial deference creates.  Part IV gleans lessons learned from other juris-
dictions, as courts and legislatures have exercised their prerogative in re-
sponse to Kelo’s invitation to impose public use requirements that are more 
stringent than the federal baseline.  Finally, Part V sets forth a proposal for 
reinvention in New York, whereby a more meaningful standard of judicial 
review might be applied when courts evaluate the propriety of legislative 
and agency determinations of blight and civic purpose. 
I.  THE NEW YORK APPROACH TO EMINENT DOMAIN LAW 
New York’s eminent domain laws stand alone, representing a broad 
grant of takings authority to various enabling agencies.  Despite the statuto-
ry requirement that a showing of “blight,” or alternatively “civic purpose,” 
be established by the given agency to justify the taking, those classifica-
tions themselves are broadly inclusive.  Courts, in turn, hesitate to second-
guess the agency determinations and abide, instead, by a posture of gener-
ous deference to government prerogative. 
Certainly, as compared to other states’ protocol in a post-Kelo world, 
New York’s eminent domain law is anachronistic.24  The mechanism in 
place in New York to permit the taking of private property for public use 
simply requires an easily satisfied showing of blight or civic purpose.  The 
New York protocol significantly limits the capacity of affected landowners 
to push back against the government’s takings powers, affording affected 
parties only thirty days to seek judicial review, or lose that right.25 
New York’s government-solicitous approach to takings is peerless.  
While requiring that notice be published so that interested landowners 
 
 23. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW §§ 101-709 (McKinney 1977). 
 24. See infra notes 112-39 and accompanying text. 
 25. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 204 (McKinney 2010). 
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might have an opportunity to object at public proceedings, it was not until 
2005 that the condemning agency was required to provide actual notice to 
those individuals directly affected by the project.26  As noted, if affected 
parties fail to seek judicial review within the prescribed thirty-day window, 
they are essentially estopped from challenging the condemnation.27  More-
over, as a predicate to seeking judicial review, interested parties must first 
attend the public hearing and voice their concerns.28  The scope of judicial 
review is limited to the objections made at the hearing.29 
New York’s swift and somewhat lopsided approach to justice in eminent 
domain matters may be a product of the specific needs of its fast-moving 
metropolis, which is rightly deemed a global center of commerce, educa-
tion, and the arts.30  As the issue was presented in Kaur, the undoubtedly 
public purpose of education is particularly vital for New York to maintain 
its status as an internationally-renowned and important center of higher 
education and academic research.31  Whatever the rationale, stated or sub-
textual, for the procedures adopted by New York, they are unmatched and 
most certainly skewed in favor of the governing agencies. 
The EDPL is the state statutory body of law that governs the acquisition 
by eminent domain of real property within the state of New York.  EDPL 
procedure requires the condemning entity to hold a public hearing prior to 
the acquisition, and to inform the public of the purpose for the project and 
the impact on the environment and residents of the locality.32  Notice of the 
public hearing must be given to residents at least ten days, but not more 
than thirty days, before the date of the hearing.  Such notice must be pub-
lished in at least five successive issues of both an official daily newspaper 
and a newspaper of general circulation.33  Remarkably, until 2005 the con-
demning agency was not required to notify affected homeowners indivi-
 
 26. See Brody v. Vill. of Port Chester, 509 F. Supp. 2d 269, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 27. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 204 (McKinney 2004). 
 28. Id. § 202(c)(2). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See generally Nasim Farjad, Note, Condemnation Friendly or Land Use Wise? A 
Broad Interpretation of the Public Use Requirement Works Well for New York City, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1121, 1161 (2007); Bureau of Int’l Info. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
U.S. Cities Reflect Cultural Diversity, Artistic Ingenuity: Regional differences add character 
to U.S. Metropolitan Centers, AMERICA.GOV (Dec. 13, 2007), http://www.america.gov/st/ 
peopleplace-english/2007/December/20071213194500GLnesnoM0.4935419.html. 
 31. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 734 (N.Y. 2010), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 32. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 201 (McKinney 1982). 
 33. Id.  However, if only weekly publications are available, it must be published in at 
least two successive issues. 
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dually.34  Finally, in 2005, the EDPL was amended to require that the 
record billing owner be given notice by certified mail within the same sta-
tutorily prescribed time frame.35 
The notice afforded affected owners must “clearly state that those prop-
erty owners who may subsequently wish to challenge condemnation of 
their property via judicial review may do so only on the basis of issues, 
facts, and objections raised at such hearing.”36  Hence, well in advance of 
the project’s launch date, the landowner must attend the public hearing, de-
termine any present or future objections that he or she may wish to raise, 
and raise such objections.  At the hearing, the proponent of the project must 
outline its purpose, proposed location, any alternative locations, and any 
other information that it deems pertinent.37  Thereafter, any person in at-
tendance is to be given a “reasonable opportunity” to present an oral or 
written statement regarding the project.38  While that provision provides 
objecting residents an opportunity to be heard, the condemning agency is 
not obliged to address their complaints, or even to take them into consid-
eration when rendering its determinations. 
The Institute for Justice found that, at the requisite public hearings, offi-
cials are neither required to answer questions from property owners nor to 
provide them with relevant supporting documents or the opportunity to di-
rectly challenge the government’s evidence.39  It has been posited that pri-
vate interest groups as well as local governments routinely inflate the “pub-
lic good” that the given project will advance mindful that, once the 
property is condemned, there is no concomitant governmental obligation to 
produce evidence of the alleged economic gains that were used to justify 
the condemnation in the first place.40  Further, the statutorily prescribed 
“reasonable opportunity” to be heard is an ambiguous term that has not 
been defined by the legislature or the courts, leaving considerable room for 
circumvention. 
The EDPL requires that, within ninety days of the public meeting, the 
agency must complete its determinations and findings concerning the pro-
 
 34. See Brody v. Vill. of Port Chester, 509 F. Supp. 2d 269, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 35. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 202 (McKinney 2004). 
 36. Id. § 202(c)(2). 
 37. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 203 (McKinney 1982). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Empire State Eminent Domain: Robin Hood in Reverse, INST. OF JUSTICE (Jan. 
2010), http://www.ij.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3045&Itemid= 
165 (referencing Dick Carpenter & John K. Ross, Robin Hood in Reverse, CITY JOURNAL, 
Jan. 15, 2010, available at http://www.city-journal.org/2010/eon0115dcjr.html). 
 40. Id. 
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posed public project.41  It is obliged to publish a brief synopsis, in at least 
two successive issues of a generally circulated newspaper, to indicate the 
public use, benefit, or purpose to be served by the project, the environmen-
tal effects, and the reasons for the selection of the particular location.42  
The agency is also required, upon written request, to provide a written copy 
of its determination and findings.43  Once officials approve the statement of 
“Determination and Findings,” property owners have thirty days to sue to 
contest the findings.44 
Significantly, New York is one of only a few states to require property 
owners to file a lawsuit before officials move to condemn.45  If property 
owners miss the thirty day window, they permanently lose the right to ob-
ject to the blight finding and to challenge an eventual condemnation.46  As 
noted, until 2005 officials were not obliged to inform property owners that 
their property was targeted for redevelopment—thus the thirty day window 
would expire before property owners even knew they had to act.47 
When property owners do attempt to defend their property, judicial re-
view is limited to the transcript of the public hearing.  The court can either 
confirm or reject the determinations, and may review whether: (1) the pro-
ceeding was in conformity with state and federal constitutions; (2) the pro-
posed acquisition was within the condemning agency’s statutory jurisdic-
tion or authority; (3) the determinations were made in accordance with 
statutory requirements; and (4) a public use, benefit, or purpose will be 
served by the proposed acquisition.48  Subsequent to the publication of its 
determinations and findings, the condemning agency has the right to amend 
the proposed project when further study of field conditions so warrants.  
The procedural protocol allows for amendment without requiring additional 
publication.49 
As a procedural matter (and setting aside for present purposes the wide 
swath of discretion afforded the condemning agency with respect to the 
substantive determination of blight), the EDPL is not particularly solicitous 
of private property rights.  From affording affected landowners only thirty 
days to seek judicial review (or lose the right), to limiting judicial review to 
those objections raised at public hearing, to creating a parade of exemp-
 
 41. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 204 (McKinney 2004). 
 42. Id. § 204(A). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 207 (amended 1991). 
 49. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 205 (amended 1977). 
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tions regarding agency compliance with the procedural protocol, the proce-
dural regime is less than generous to the targets of agency action.  The pro-
cedural safeguards are waived if the agency, for example, obtains a license 
permit or certificate of public convenience from a state, federal, or local 
government agency, obtains a certificate of environmental compatibility 
and public need pursuant to the public service law, or undergoes or pur-
ports to undergo prior to acquisition one or more public hearings.50 
In conjunction with the EDPL, takings of private property for public use 
are effectuated in accordance with the UDCA.  The UDCA creates a corpo-
rate governmental agency, known as the New York State Urban Develop-
ment Corporation (“UDC”), which is granted the authority to “acquire, 
construct, reconstruct, rehabilitate or improve such industrial, manufactur-
ing, commercial, educational, recreational and cultural facilities . . . and to 
carry out the clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
such substandard and insanitary areas.”51  The UDCA permits the UDC to 
exercise eminent domain for land use projects and civic projects. 
Under the UDCA, a land use project is defined as “[a] plan or undertak-
ing for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction, and rehabilitation . . . of a 
substandard and insanitary area, and for recreational or other facilities inci-
dental or appurtenant thereto, pursuant to and in accordance with article 
eighteen of the constitution and this act.”52  The UDC must find that the 
area in which the land improvement project is to be located is “substandard 
or insanitary” or is in danger of becoming such, and “tends to impair or ar-
rest the sound growth and development of the municipality.”53  “Substan-
dard or insanitary” is interchangeable with “a slum, blighted, deteriorated 
or deteriorating area or an area which has a blighting influence on the sur-
rounding area.”54  No further guidance on the meaning of the term “blight” 
is offered by the UDCA itself. 
II.  “BLIGHT” AS A STANDARDLESS STANDARD 
After conducting research on New York’s eminent domain protocol, the 
Institute for Justice published findings that chronicle the ease with which 
blight designations are made.  The blight designation can be affixed to any 
neighborhood “in need of redevelopment.”55  That designation, in turn, can 
rest on such dubious grounds as “outmoded design,” the “lack of suitable 
 
 50. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 206 (amended 1978). 
 51. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6252 (McKinney 2011). 
 52. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6253(6)(c) (McKinney 2009). 
 53. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6260(c)(1) (McKinney 2011). 
 54. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6253(12) (McKinney 2009). 
 55. Carpenter & Ross, supra note 39. 
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off-street parking,” or the danger that the area might become “substandard 
or insanitary.”56  Municipalities have enough latitude to wield the blight 
stamp so that “virtually any property fits the bill,” and courts in turn rarely 
scrutinize those blight designations.57 
In Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,58 the Atlantic 
Yards case, New York’s highest court approved the seizure of what dis-
senting Judge Robert Smith called a “normal and pleasant residential com-
munity.”59  In that case, the ESDC sought to use its eminent domain power 
to undertake a “mixed-use development” that was proposed by private de-
veloper FCRC, for the benefit of that developer.60  The project sought to 
condemn private property in order to make way for the construction of a 
sports arena to house the NBA Nets franchise.61  Petitioners, affected pri-
vate property owners, alleged that the land at issue was not in fact blighted.  
The New York Court of Appeals responded that “[t]hey are doubtless cor-
rect that the conditions cited in support of the blight finding at issue do not 
begin to approach in severity the dire circumstances of urban slum dwelling 
described by the Muller court in 1936.”62 
Yet, in Goldstein, instead of reviewing the record to assess the propriety 
of the blight designation, the court chose to defer wholesale to the agency’s 
determination.  It concluded that “[i]t is only where there is no room for 
reasonable difference of opinion as to whether an area is blighted, that 
judges may substitute their views as to the adequacy with which the public 
purpose of blight removal has been made out for those of the legislatively 
designated agencies . . . .”63  Further, the court determined that once the 
legislative agency has made its findings, absent a showing of corruption or 
irrationality, “there is nothing for the courts to do about it.”64 
Similarly, the concurrence in Kaur took considerable issue with the 
blight classification, but felt compelled to vote with the majority because of 
the weight of precedent.65  The court’s endorsement of the findings of 
blight, despite the evidence that the private entity receiving the benefits of 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). 
 59. Id. at 190 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 166. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 171; see also N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936) (devel-
oping the blight exception to the public use doctrine). 
 63. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub 
nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
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that classification, Columbia University, wielded a heavy hand in influen-
cing the determination of blight, makes plainer the extent of the New York 
judiciary’s wholesale deference to agency determinations of blight.66  Prior 
to the ESDC’s conclusion that the area in question was “blighted,” West 
Harlem was not in a depressed economic condition.67  To the contrary, “the 
2002 West Harlem Master Plan stated that not only was Harlem experienc-
ing a renaissance of economic development, but that the area had great de-
velopment potential that could easily be realized through rezoning.”68  Fac-
tors that led to the area’s designation as blighted included the presence of 
unpainted block walls, loose awning supports, and sidewalk and building 
defects.69  Significantly, the ESDC study substantiating the characterization 
of blight failed to include vital considerations such as an analysis of real 
estate values, rental demand, rezoning applications, and prior proposals for 
development of the waterfront area.70 
Goldstein and Kaur demonstrate just how expansively the blight desig-
nation has been construed and applied in New York.  The hollowness of the 
blight classification renders vulnerable any area where economic develop-
ment could be increased.  Certainly, “[a] sufficiently expansive definition 
of blight is essentially equivalent to authorizing economic development 
takings.”71 
To solidify a government’s capability to essentially effectuate takings at 
will, the New York statutory scheme authorizes condemnations not only to 
remediate “blight,” however broadly conceived, but also to advance “civic 
projects.”72  A “civic project” is defined as “[a] project or that portion of a 
multi-purpose project designed and intended for the purpose of providing 
facilities for educational, cultural, recreational, community, municipal, 
public service or other civic purposes.”73  As a result, the “civic project” 
classification serves as a catch-all and back-up plan, in the unlikely event 
that government is unsuccessful at deeming an area “blighted.”  In Kaur, 
 
 66. Ilya Somin, New York High Court Upholds Columbia University Takings, THE VO-
LOKH CONSPIRACY (June 24, 2010), http://volokh.com.category/2010/06/24/new-york-high-
court-upholds-columbia-university-takings/. 
 67. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), 
rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. at 22. 
 70. Id.  
 71. See Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings 
After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 266 (2007) (alteration in original). 
 72. N.Y. URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ACT 174/68 § 3(6)(d) (2006) (alteration 
in original). 
 73. Id. 
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the New York Court of Appeals went so far as to approve the ESDC’s al-
ternative classification of Columbia’s plans for expansion as a “civic 
project.”74  Its willingness to defer to the agency’s determinations is made 
even plainer when it notes that, “[o]f course, ESDC is statutorily empo-
wered to exercise eminent domain in furtherance of a civic project regard-
less of whether a project site suffers from blight.”75 
III.  A BLIND DEFERENCE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE: THE NEW 
YORK COURTS’ RELUCTANCE TO SECOND-GUESS AGENCY 
DETERMINATIONS 
On the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted emphatically that 
“[t]he role of the judiciary in determining whether [the eminent domain] 
power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow 
one.”76  In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court found that “[C]ongress 
and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into ac-
count a wide variety of values.  It is not for [the Court] to reappraise 
them.”77  Certainly, courts are not in a position to “oversee the choice of 
the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project 
area.”78  Rather, once the matter of public purpose has been resolved, “the 
amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a 
particular tract to complete the integrated plan rest in the discretion of the 
legislative branch.”79  Likewise, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,80 
the Supreme Court determined that the “public use” requirement is coter-
minous with the scope of a sovereign’s police power.81  The Court made 
clear that it would not substitute its judgment for the legislature’s judgment 
as to what constitutes a public use unless the use in question is “palpably 
without reasonable foundation.”82 
In Kelo v. City of New London,83 the Court found itself confronted with 
the question of “whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public pur-
 
 74. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 733 (N.Y. 2010), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (alteration in original). 
 77. Id. at 33 (alteration in original). 
 78. Id. at 36. 
 79. Id. at 35-36 (alteration in original). 
 80. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 81. Id. at 240. 
 82. Id. at 241 (alteration in original). 
 83. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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pose.’”84  The Court acknowledged that, without exception, precedent de-
fined the public purpose construct broadly, reflecting a longstanding policy 
of deference to legislative judgments in the field.85  Justice Stevens, writing 
for the majority, noted that “our earliest cases in particular embodied a 
strong theme of federalism, emphasizing the ‘great respect’ that we owe to 
state legislatures and state courts in discerning local public needs.”86  For 
more than a century, the jurisprudence governing public use “widely 
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legis-
latures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of 
the takings power.”87  Those policies form the bedrock for much of the Su-
preme Court’s approach to determinations of blight. 
On the other hand, the Court has made plain that even a rational basis 
standard of review must have teeth.  In his concurrence in Kelo, Justice 
Kennedy stated that “[a] court applying rational-basis review under the 
Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is 
intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretex-
tual public benefits.”88  Meaningful rational basis review requires that 
courts conduct an extensive inquiry into primary and incidental benefit.89  
Even more significantly, the traditional presumption of validity may not 
apply to a more narrowly drawn category of takings.  “There may be pri-
vate transfers in which the risk of undetected, impermissible favoritism of 
private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of 
invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.”90 
Thus, Kelo itself suggests a basis for considered judicial review when 
the condemnation is motivated by private economic interests.91  Certainly, 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in that case placed particular emphasis on 
review of the motivations to attend the underlying planning process that ul-
timately called for the exercise of the takings power.92  He acknowledged 
that an acute inference of impermissible preferential treatment could well 
warrant the presumption that the private transfer itself is invalid. 93 
 
 84. Id. at 480 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 
(1896)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 482. 
 87. Id. at 483. 
 88. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. at 493. 
 91. See Charles E. Cohen, The Abstruse Science: Kelo, Lochner, and Representation 
Reinforcement in the Public Use Debate, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 375, 412-13 (2008). 
 92. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. at 493. 
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The New York judiciary’s insistence on wholesale deference to legisla-
tive and agency determinations of blight, particularly in Kaur, misses this 
call.  If Kaur does not provide an object lesson on impermissible favorit-
ism, what does?  Columbia was both the architect and beneficiary of the 
blight designation.  The court repeatedly recognized that “the record before 
ESDC contains no evidence whatsoever that Manhattanville was blighted 
prior to Columbia gaining control over the vast majority of the property 
therein.”94  After Columbia began acquiring the property in question, the 
ESDC made no further attempts to independently ascertain that the condi-
tions in the area were blighted until March 2006, four years after the West 
Harlem study found that while the area could be revitalized through rezon-
ing, it was not blighted.95  ESDC’s inexplicable delay in assessing the 
property until long after Columbia had established control over it, as well 
as Columbia’s intentional dereliction, raise a credible, if not acute inference 
that the blight designation was manipulated to impermissibly favor a pri-
vate actor.96  Examples of this behavior include permitting water infiltra-
tion conditions to go unaddressed and letting building code and local ordin-
ance violations pile up.97 
If rational basis review is to have meaning, the New York judiciary must 
reclaim its role as a meaningful check on the coordinating branches.  
Somehow, in New York, deference has devolved into wholesale surrender 
of the judicial role.  Certainly, history in New York shows that judicial re-
straint is not meant to be judicial abdication. 
While the New York courts have long recognized that the extensive au-
thority to make initial blight determinations is vested in agencies and muni-
cipalities, even limited judicial review has traditionally been construed to 
require more than a perfunctory review of the record below.98  Certainly, 
the governing statute vests duly designated municipal officials with discre-
tion in the designation and selection of substandard areas,99 and courts may 
review those findings only upon a limited basis.100  That review, however, 
has meant more than a mere rubber stamp. 
 
 94. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2009), rev’d, 933 N.E. 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. 
State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 95. Id. at 16-17. 
 96. Id. at 21. 
 97. Id.  
 98. See generally Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975); 
Ziegler v. Chapin, 27 N.E. 471 (N.Y. 1891); Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 
1953). 
 99. Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d at 332-33 (finding that the record showed a substantial factual 
basis to find the area involved substandard). 
 100. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y. 2009). 
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For example, in 1953, the plaintiff in Kaskel disputed the conclusion of 
various qualified public bodies and officers that the area in question, in 
Manhattan, was, in fact, substandard and insanitary.101  The court carefully 
reviewed the record and found that there was ample evidence to justify the 
determination of the city planning commission that a substantial part of the 
area in question was substandard and insanitary.102  Nothing in the record 
could sustain a finding of corruption, irrationality, or baselessness.103 
Later, in Talcott v. Buffalo,104 the court noted that a posture of judicial 
deference with respect to matters within the discretion of local officers and 
municipal bodies facilitates aims of efficiency and recognizes the wisdom 
of the political process: 
Whatever evils may exist in the government of cities, that are due to mis-
takes, errors of judgment, or the lack of intelligent appreciation of official 
duty, must necessarily be temporary, compared with the mischief and in-
convenience which judicial supervision, in all cases, would ultimately 
produce.  Local officers are elected or appointed for such brief periods 
that frequent opportunity is afforded to the public and the taxpayers inter-
ested in their official acts to change them and substitute others in their 
place.105 
The capacity, however, to “vote out” those in charge is not available un-
der the present statutory scheme for takings in New York.  Members of the 
governing agency are neither popularly elected nor readily susceptible to 
the checks that transparency and accountability would otherwise pro-
vide.106  Particularly here, courts must reemerge as meaningful checks on 
“the lack of intelligent appreciation of official duty.”107 
New York’s own jurisprudence concedes this role for the courts. In 
Yonkers, the court held that: 
[C]ourts are required to be more than rubber stamps in the determination 
of the existence of substandard conditions in urban renewal condemnation 
cases.  The findings of the agency are not self-executing.  A determination 
 
 101. Kaskel, 115 N.E.2d at 661. 
 102. See id. at 662. 
 103. See id.  
 104. 26 N.E. 263, 264-65 (N.Y. 1890). 
 105. Id. at 265. 
 106. See generally Paula A. Franzese & Daniel J. O’Hern, Restoring the Public Trust: An 
Agenda for Ethics Reform of State Government and a Proposed Model for New Jersey, 57 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2005) (exalting the aims of transparency and accountability as 
cornerstones of good government). 
 107. Talcott, 26 N.E. at 265. 
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of public purpose must be made by the courts themselves and they must 
have a basis on which to do so.108 
Yet, in Goldstein, New York’s highest court reasoned that “[t]he Consti-
tution accords government broad power to take and clear substandard and 
insanitary areas for redevelopment. In doing so, it commensurately de-
prives the Judiciary of grounds to interfere with the exercise.”109  In that 
case, the ESDC sought to obtain, through the use of eminent domain, cer-
tain privately owned property in downtown Brooklyn for inclusion in a 
land use improvement project known as Atlantic Yards.  The project was to 
be accomplished by a private developer.  Certain landowners objected to 
the taking as a violation of the state constitution, which requires the use of 
eminent domain only for a public purpose.  The Court of Appeals deter-
mined that eradicating blight from an area is a sufficient public purpose to 
comply with the constitutional requirement.110 
The Goldstein court noted the potential for abuse that an expansive con-
ceptualization of blight can wield, but opted to leave that concern to the 
legislature. 
It may be that the bar has now been set too low—that what will now pass 
as ‘blight,’ as that expression has come to be understood . . . should not be 
permitted to constitute a predicate for the invasion of property rights and 
the razing of homes and business.  But any such limitation upon the sove-
reign power of eminent domain as it has come to be defined in the urban 
renewal context is a matter for the Legislature, not the courts.111 
For courts to yield the floor wholesale because statutory reform is within 
the purview of the popularly elected branches begs the question.  In both 
Goldstein and Kaur, New York’s highest court missed the opportunity to 
exercise appropriately its own authority, certainly within the province of 
the judiciary, to review the records below to determine whether they could 
support the blight designation in the first place.  Even a posture of judicial 
deference to the coordinating branches of government accommodates, 
rightly so, room for courts to serve as a check on the potential for abuse.  
Otherwise, the constitutional guarantees are eviscerated.  A comparative 
assessment of the experiences of other jurisdictions, together with an ex-
amination of New York’s own earlier precedent, makes plain that courts 
must have a voice in the evolving colloquy on blight. 
 
 
 108. Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 333 (N.Y. 1975). 
 109. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 173 (N.Y. 2009). 
 110. Id. at 170-71. 
 111. Id. at 172. 
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IV.  THE LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE: STATUTORY REFORM EFFORTS 
IN A POST-KELO NATION 
Kelo inspired a veritable national backlash, as states accepted Justice 
Stevens’ invitation in that case to “impose ‘public use’ requirements that 
are stricter than the federal baseline.”112  Those more stringent safeguards 
against government abuse have come largely as a consequence of legisla-
tive reform.  Most states have modified or crafted eminent domain statutes 
that narrow and more carefully prescribe the appropriate grounds for exer-
cise of the takings power.113  Others have used state constitutional law to 
derive meaningful limitations on the use of eminent domain for economic 
development.114  Still others have passed constitutional amendments ren-
dering takings for economic revitalization impermissible.115 
As further evidence of the public’s post-Kelo engagement with the issue 
of eminent domain, in the November 2006 elections voters in ten states ap-
proved ballot measures that restricted government takings powers.116  Post-
Kelo legislation banned takings for economic redevelopment, barred post-
condemnation transfers to private parties, or both.117  Recognizing states’ 
capacity to more stridently narrow the reach of governmental takings, then-
Judge Roberts opined during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings that 
“legislative bodies in the states [possess the power to] protect [citizens of 
those states] . . . where the Court has determined, as it did 5-4 in Kelo, that 
[it is] not going to draw that line.”118 
The Florida legislature enacted one of the more, if not the most, stringent 
set of post-Kelo restrictions on government authority to exercise its powers 
of eminent domain.119  On its face, the Florida Constitution contains a 
broad rendering of the takings power, sanctioning condemnations for “pub-
 
 112. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005). 
 113. See ALA. CODE § 24-2-2 (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.013(1) (West 2006); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.540 (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271(1) (West 2002); 35 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (West 1997). 
 114. See Gallenthin v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 465 (N.J. 2007). 
 115. See Alberto B. Lopez, Revisiting Kelo and Eminent Domain’s “Summer of Scruti-
ny,” 59 ALA. L. REV. 561, 591 (2008) (noting that Louisiana and South Carolina have re-
sorted to constitutional amendment to reform takings law). 
 116. Id. at 601; see also Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Property Rights Issues on the 
2006 Ballot, NCSL (Nov. 12, 2006), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17595 (noting 
that Louisiana’s measure received fifty-five percent of the vote while South Carolina’s 
measure received eighty-six percent of the vote). 
 117. See ALA. CODE § 24-2-2; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.013(1); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
416.540; MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271(1); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702. 
 118. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United Sates: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 286 (2005). 
 119. Lopez, supra note 115, at 591-92. 
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lic purpose.”120  However, despite claims that they would “hinder the revi-
talization of inner cities,” Florida’s legislative amendments now bar go-
vernmental agencies from using the takings power to convey property “to a 
natural person or private entity.”121  Not satisfied with that barrier, Florida 
went one step further, legislatively prohibiting the exercise of eminent do-
main “for the purpose of abating or eliminating a public nuisance” or “for 
the purpose of preventing or eliminating slum or blight conditions.”122 
Missouri modified its eminent domain statutes so that “[n]o condemning 
authority shall acquire private property through the process of eminent do-
main for solely economic development purposes.”123  “Economic develop-
ment” purposes include measures intended to increase the “tax base, tax 
revenues, employment, and general economic health.”124  Similarly, Ken-
tucky decided to completely strike the word “purpose” from its eminent 
domain statutes.125  Thus, takings are now limited to those for “public 
use.”126  In turn, the Kentucky legislature determined that “no provision in 
the law of the Commonwealth shall be construed to authorize the condem-
nation of private property for transfer to a private owner for the purpose of 
economic development that benefits the general public only indirectly.”127  
Still, neither Missouri nor Kentucky prohibits exercise of the takings power 
to eliminate “blighted areas or substandard and unsanitary areas.”128 
Both Pennsylvania and Alabama have “redefined . . . ‘blight’ for con-
demnation purposes . . . to reduce the number of properties eligible for ac-
quisition.”129  “Pennsylvania . . . modified the definition of blight as set 
forth in its Urban Redevelopment Law, which was enacted in 1945.”130 
The . . . statute defined ‘blight’ by reference to seven factors: (1) unsafe, 
unsanitary, inadequate or over-crowded conditions of the houses in the 
particular area; (2) inadequate planning in the area; (3) excessive land 
coverage by the buildings in the area; (4) lack of adequate light and air 
and open space; (5) the defective design and arrangement of the buildings 
 
 120. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a) (1968) (declaring that “no private property shall be taken 
except for a public purpose and with full compensation”). 
 121. Lopez, supra note 115, at 591-92. 
 122. See id. at 592. 
 123. MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271(1) (West 2002). 
 124. Id. § 523.271(2). 
 125. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.540 (West 2005). 
 126. Id.  Kentucky redefined “condemn” as taking private property for a “public use” 
(formerly “purpose”) pursuant to eminent domain, and redefined eminent domain as the 
“right of the Commonwealth to take for a public use” (formerly “purpose”). 
 127. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(3) (West 2005). 
 128. MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271(2) (West 2002); see also Lopez, supra note 115, at 593. 
 129. Lopez, supra note 115, at 593. 
 130. Id.; see also 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (West 1997). 
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in the area; (6) faulty street layout; or (7) land uses in the area which are 
economically or socially undesirable.131 
In response to Kelo, Pennsylvania’s statute now restricts the blight de-
signation to any one of a series of factors aimed at curtailing unbridled dis-
cretion in the hands of state and local government.132  The list of circums-
tances capable of sustaining the blight designation include those locations 
that constitute a “public nuisance at common law,” an “attractive nuisance 
to children,” buildings that are “vermin infested,” lots or parcels that are “a 
haven for rodents,” or properties classified as “abandoned.”133 
Alabama resorted to a similar approach when redefining blight in the af-
termath of Kelo.134  The statute now defines “blighted property” as portions 
of the community with “buildings, or improvements, which, because of di-
lapidation, deterioration or unsanitary or unsafe conditions, vacancy or ab-
andonment, neglect or lack of maintenance, inadequate provision of venti-
lation, light, air, sanitation, vermin infestation, or lack of necessary 
facilities and equipment, are unfit for human habitation or occupancy.”135  
By contrast, takings of less than blighted areas for purposes of urban re-
newal are not permitted without owner consent.136 
Even those reform efforts, however, are not without their detractors.  
Legislative attempts at redefining blight have been criticized as vague and 
less than adequate for purposes of protecting against governmental over-
reaching.137  Given the definitional vagaries that permeate much of the 
post-Kelo legislation, critics contend that reform efforts tend to do little 
more than “preserve the status quo.”138  Some maintain that legislatures for 
the most part opted for measures that barred the specific exercises of emi-
nent domain that incited the anti-Kelo outcry without remediating the real 
 
 131. Lopez, supra note 115, at 593; see also 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1702(a). 
 132. See Property Rights Protection Act, 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 205(b)(1)-(12) (2006). 
 133. Id. 
 134. ALA. CODE § 24-2-2 (2010). 
 135. Id. § 24-2-2(c)(1). 
 136. Id. § 24-2-2(b). 
 137. See Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful 
Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709, 725 (stating that “[d]efinitions of 
‘blight’ are generally vague enough to allow condemnation of almost any property”); So-
min, supra note 71 (commenting that “[a] sufficiently expansive definition of blight is es-
sentially equivalent to authorizing economic development takings”). 
 138. Lopez, supra note 115, at 594 (citing David Barron, Eminent Domain is Dead! 
(Long Live Eminent Domain!), BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2006, at D1 (characterizing post-Kelo 
reforms as having “more bark than bite”)); see also Terry Pristin, Voters Back Limits on 
Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at C6 (reporting that “[e]minent domain spe-
cialists on both sides . . . say many of the statutes enacted by state legislatures have few 
teeth”). 
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potential for government misuse of the blight designation.139  These legisla-
tive deficiencies suggest that, even in the presence of statutory reform ef-
forts, courts have a role to play in protecting against such abuse. 
V.  PUTTING SOME MUSCLE BACK INTO JUDICIAL REVIEW: 
REINVENTION IN NEW YORK 
While judicial deference can and has served salutary ends when it comes 
to legislative agency determinations of blight, a posture of judicial restraint 
must not be reduced to one of blind deference.  Wholesale judicial rubber 
stamping of the coordinating branches’ prerogatives is ill-advised for a host 
of reasons.  There must be a more meaningful role for the courts when 
called upon to adjudicate those matters that transcend the interests of the 
litigants themselves.  Such cases, often implicating a mix of individual and 
societal interests, may well render inescapable judicial balancing of public 
policy considerations.  This recognition is particularly compelling in tak-
ings cases, where the interests at stake implicate both the individual and the 
collective interests of the community. 
Certainly, a government’s redevelopment authority cannot be unfettered.  
Courts have a role to play in assuring that the appropriate balance is struck 
between the means and ends of redevelopment and the rights of property 
owners.  The national experience reveals that courts are capable of dis-
charging this role fairly.  For example, the Ohio Supreme Court, refusing to 
rubber stamp government designations of land as “deteriorating,” deemed 
that classification a “standardless standard.”140  In the court’s estimation, 
Ohio’s statutory scheme does not afford fair notice to property owners and 
invites “ad hoc and selective enforcement.”141 
While applying a rational basis standard of review, the Ohio courts rec-
ognize that even limited judicial scrutiny “remains a critical constitutional 
component.”142  Significantly, the court emphasized that the judiciary’s 
“independence is critical, particularly when the authority for the taking is 
delegated to another or the contemplated public use is dependent on a pri-
vate entity.”143  Particularly in those instances in which the state takes pri-
 
 139. See John E. Kramer & Lisa Knepper, One Year After Kelo Argument National 
Property Rights Revolt Still Going Strong: 43 State Legislatures Work Toward Eminent 
Domain Reform, INST. FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.ij.org/index.php?option 
=com_content&task+view&id=933&Itemid=165. 
 140. City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1145 (Ohio 2006). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1138. 
 143. Id. at 1139. 
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vate property and transfers it to another private person or entity, “judicial 
review of the taking is paramount.”144 
Perhaps most relevant to reform of the New York model is the expe-
rience just across the Hudson River, in New Jersey.  Recently, in Gallen-
thin Realty Development, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court determined that, as a matter of state constitutional law, 
government designations of blight must rest upon “substantial evidence.”145  
Moreover, the court interpreted the New Jersey Local Redevelopment and 
Housing Law to bar the designation of blight when, in the estimation of the 
local planning board, the parcel in question is deemed merely “stagnant or 
not fully productive.”146 
While affording the New Jersey statutory scheme the presumption of 
constitutionality and considerable deference, and “recogniz[ing] that gov-
ernment redevelopment is a valuable tool for municipalities faced with 
economic deterioration in their communities[,]”147 the court in Gallenthin 
did not hesitate to scrutinize the record to gauge the integrity of the muni-
cipality’s blight designation.  Judicial deference must mean more, the court 
tacitly observed, than judicial endorsement of a record that contains essen-
tially “a bland recitation of applicable statutory criteria and a declaration 
that those criteria are met.”148  Rather, “municipal redevelopment designa-
tions are entitled to deference provided that they are supported by substan-
tial evidence on the record.”149  In Gallethin, the court held that the sub-
stantial evidence standard was not met, mindful that the municipality’s 
decision was supported “by only the net opinion of an expert.”150 
The New Jersey Supreme Court derived its authority to impose a mea-
ningful check on government’s exercise of its redevelopment powers from 
the state’s constitution.  The relevant constitutional provisions restrict re-
development to “blighted areas.”151  Intended to strike a “balance between 
municipal redevelopment and property owners’ rights,” the blight showing 
mandated by the constitution could not be sustained, the court determined 
“solely because the property is not used in an optimal manner.” 152 
Significantly, New Jersey’s constitutional provisions on blight are quite 
similar to those contained in the New York Constitution.  New Jersey’s 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. 924 A.2d 447, 465 (N.J. 2007). 
 146. Id. at 458-65. 
 147. Id. at 460. 
 148. Id. at 465. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 1 (1947). 
 152. Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 465. 
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blighted areas clause decrees that “[t]he clearance, replanning, develop-
ment or redevelopment of blighted areas shall be a public purpose and pub-
lic use, for which private property may be taken or acquired.”153  Corres-
pondingly, New York’s relevant constitutional provision indicates that “the 
legislature may provide . . . for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of substandard and insanitary areas.”154  Yet, notwith-
standing the comparable enabling grants, the New Jersey courts have put 
some steel into the blight conceptualization, while the recent pronounce-
ments of the New York judiciary, in Goldstein and Kaur, reveal a consider-
able disinclination to do the same. 
In Gallenthin, the New Jersey court noted that blight “presumes deteri-
oration or stagnation that negatively affects surrounding areas.”155  By con-
trast, property cannot constitutionally be deemed “in need of redevelop-
ment” simply because it is “not fully productive.”156  The court saw fit to 
review the record below, and found that it could not support the redeve-
lopment designation by substantial evidence.157  The government’s reliance 
on the conclusions of one expert—that the area in question was unim-
proved, partially vacant, and not optimally utilized—was deemed inade-
quate.158 
The government’s capacity to issue a designation of blight on the basis 
of underutilization is fiercely problematic.  The court in Kaur endeavored 
to explain that “[t]he theoretical justification for using the degree of utiliza-
tion of development rights as an indicator of blight is the inference that it 
reflects owners’ inability to make profitable use of full development rights 
due to lack of demand.”159  This rather self-serving rationalization renders 
any property, which the government finds less than optimally operated, 
susceptible to the takings power.  The Kaur court acknowledged that “[i]f 
such an all-encompassing definition of ‘blight’ were adopted, most proper-
ty in the State would be eligible for redevelopment.”160 
The potential, in Justice Kennedy’s lexicon, for “impermissible favorit-
ism of private parties”161 is particularly acute when a government agency is 
 
 153. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, para. 1 (1947). 
 154. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1 (amended 1965). 
 155. Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 457. 
 156. Id. at 449. 
 157. See id. at 449-54, 464-65. 
 158. See id. at 464. 
 159. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 22 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 
933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban 
Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). 
 160. Id. at 23 (quoting Gallenthin, 924 A.2d at 460). 
 161. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
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allowed to decide property ownership based on its own opinion of who or 
what would put the land to a more productive or attractive use.  Moreover, 
“the bundle of sticks” that those of us who teach property law use as a me-
taphor to describe the cadre of rights and duties that ownership contem-
plates, including the owner’s prerogative to use, or not use, to the exclusion 
of others, would fall away if government were to become arbiter and refe-
ree of productivity. 
Mindful of the Gallenthin court’s concerns with respect to the adequacy 
of the record, the record in Kaur reveals that no comprehensive develop-
ment plan was ever created.  Moreover, the situs of government’s reach, 
West Harlem, “was not in a depressed economic condition” at the time that 
the EDC and ESDC embarked on their mission to find blight.162  Most sig-
nificantly, the private party to reap the benefits of the blight designation, 
Columbia University, was the “progenitor of its own benefit.”163  Columbia 
University spent years quietly buying up considerable properties that would 
come within the scope of its proposed expansion, only to then allow those 
properties to fall into disrepair.164  Later, the state of those premises’ decay 
was used by the ESDC to substantiate its designation of blight.165 
Further, the court in Kaur viewed with some skepticism the characteriza-
tion of Columbia University’s expansion project as a “civic project.”166  
Columbia is the sole beneficiary of the project.  At best, “the public benefit 
is incrementally incidental to the private benefits” conferred.167  Surely, a 
judicial vetting of the propriety of government’s exercise of its takings 
powers to transfer private property to another private entity “who will use it 
in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public”168 was 
warranted. 
In Kelo, Justice O’Connor’s dissent sets forth precisely this basic precept 
in the following way: 
Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now 
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so 
long as it might be upgraded—i.e. given to an owner who will use it in a 
 
 162. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 19 (noting that “[t]he 2002 West Harlem Master Plan stated 
that not only was Harlem experiencing a renaissance of economic development, but that the 
area had great development potential that could easily be realized through rezoning”). 
 163. Id. at 20. 
 164. Id. (“It is important to note that the record before ESDC contains no evidence what-
soever that Manhattanville was blighted prior to Columbia gaining control over the vast ma-
jority of property therein.”). 
 165. Id. at 21. 
 166. See id. at 23-24. 
 167. Id. at 24. 
 168. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public—in the 
process.  To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits 
resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render eco-
nomic development takings “for public use” is to wash out any distinction 
between private and public use of property—and thereby effectively to 
delete the words “for public use” from the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.169 
Certainly, both the state and federal jurisprudence is rife with emphasis 
on judicial deference.  In Berman170 and Midkiff,171 the Supreme Court 
made plain the significance of deferring to legislative findings about public 
purpose.  The Court recognized that the judiciary is “ill equipped to eva-
luate the efficacy of proposed legislative initiatives” and ultimately rejected 
as unworkable the concept that courts ought to decide what constitutes a 
governmental function.  Similarly, Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion 
in Kelo concedes the inability of courts to evaluate whether eminent do-
main is a necessary means to pursue the legislature’s ends.172  However, 
Justice O’Connor hastened to add that: 
[F]or all the emphasis on deference, Berman and Midkiff hewed to a be-
drock principle without which our public use jurisprudence would col-
lapse: “A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the 
public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of govern-
ment and would thus be void . . . .”173  To protect that principle, those de-
cisions reserved a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature’s 
judgment of what constitutes a public use . . . though the Court in Berman 
made clear that it is “an extremely narrow” one.174 
Reinvention in New York will depend on the capacity of the courts to 
reclaim their place as meaningful actors in a tripartite system of checks and 
balances.  While the province of the judiciary in passing on the propriety of 
government takings is narrow, New York’s own precedent makes plain that 
“courts are required to be more than rubber stamps in the determination of 
the existence of substandard conditions in urban renewal condemnation 
cases.  The findings of the agency are not self-executing.”175  The statutory 
template specifically allows for judicial review as to whether “the proceed-
ings were in conformity with the federal and state constitutions” and 
whether “a public use, benefit, or purpose will be served by the proposed 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 171. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 172. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 499 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 500 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245). 
 174. Id. at 240 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32). 
 175. Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 333 (N.Y. 1975). 
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acquisition.”176  Indeed, there is nothing in New York’s enabling grant or 
statutory scheme to deny courts the opportunity to assess “whether the 
agency’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record that 
was before the agency at the time of its decision.”177 
The judiciary’s insistence that the blight designation be supported by 
substantial evidence in no way usurps the appropriate province of the com-
peting branches of government.  The court is not superimposing its judg-
ments onto the legislative scheme, mindful that the governing agency is 
presumptively best suited to grappling with the complex economic, social, 
political and moral issues involved.178  Nor should the court “impede the 
ability of governments to solve holdout and other market failure problems, 
as well as to regulate industries through the reassignment of property 
rights.”179  Indeed, New York’s use of eminent domain for economic de-
velopment projects has increased tax revenues, employment opportunities, 
and overall neighborhood vitality in a number of vicinages.180 
The court, however, does enforce the constitution.  To render considera-
tion of the constitutionality of the exercise of the takings power to the polit-
ical branches is an abdication of that function.181  Particularly in the arena 
of economic redevelopment, where untoward influences and “germs of cor-
ruption”182 can infect the playing field, courts must assure that the interests 
of all property owners are sufficiently safeguarded.183  The responsibility of 
the judiciary becomes especially vital in New York because the agency 
making the blight classifications is immune to public vote or outcry.184 
That New York courts must emerge as relevant actors on the stage of 
takings law is made plainer still in view of the less than strident procedural 
safeguards in place to protect landowners and the absence in the statutory 
text of any meaningful definition of “blight” and “civic purpose.”  Mindful 
 
 176. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 207 (McKinney 2010). 
 177. See Jackson v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 437 (N.Y. 1986). 
 178. See Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Property 
Rights, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 125-26. 
 179. See id. at 106. 
 180. See Farjad, supra note 30, at 1121. 
 181. See generally James W. Ely, Jr., Can the “Despotic Power” Be Tamed?  Reconsi-
dering the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, 17 ABA PROB. & PROP. 31, 36 (2003) 
(“Generalized statements as to the necessity for a taking, sometimes veering toward mere 
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 184. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. 
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that the New York legislature has granted a separate entity the authority to 
exercise condemnation proceedings, courts must ensure that the grant of 
authority is construed strictly.  Doubts over the propriety of the taking 
should be resolved in favor of the targeted property owners.185 
Courts should require that the blight designation be supported by sub-
stantial evidence.  At a minimum, the judiciary must engage in more than 
perfunctory review of the record below.  Certainly, as articulated in the 
archives of New York’s own precedent, “even where the law expressly de-
fines the removal or prevention of blight as a public purpose and leaves to 
the agencies wide discretion in deciding what constitutes blight, facts sup-
porting such determinations should be spelled out.”186 
CONCLUSION 
While New York state court precedent has long compelled judicial defe-
rence to agency blight determinations, deference must be construed to re-
quire more than blind endorsement.  This assertion is particularly apt as ap-
plied to the New York model, which affords its enabling agencies broad 
grants of authority to accomplish takings.  Against the backdrop of New 
York’s uniquely permissive eminent domain laws, courts must be more 
than wholesale abiders of the agency’s will. 
When blight designations are allowed to stand unchecked, no matter the 
machinations that may have distorted that very characterization, individual 
liberties are compromised and the public trust betrayed.  The most recent 
New York Court of Appeals cases on point, Goldstein and Kaur, demon-
strate the ease with which government agencies can justify their actions, no 
matter how susceptible the record is to real inferences of manipulation and 
heavy-handedness.  Particularly then, courts must not yield the floor 
wholesale to the wisdom of the political process. 
The procedural safeguards advanced by the New York protocol are 
anemic at best.  In the presence of a largely toothless statutory and regula-
tory scheme, the public trust depends on a more involved judiciary.  A 
standard of review that requires that blight determinations be supported by 
substantial evidence can protect against infection of the takings process by 
privatized actors inescapably motivated by self-interest. 
The record amassed in Kaur makes plain that blight findings are suscept-
ible to distortion at the hands of those private interests who have most to 
gain from the blight designation.  Against this landscape, even the most 
modestly applied standard of review obliges courts to do more than defer 
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wholesale to the coordinating branches prerogatives.  Government must be 
put to its proofs, and the build-up to the blight designation must be ex-
amined to weed out instances of abuse and manipulation.  Courts must de-
mand more than broad descriptions of property as unsanitary or deteri-
orated.  Legislative agencies must be made to justify their determinations 
with evidence to show that the blighted conditions truly permeate and are 
not self-inflicted. 
The heart of our system of checks and balances depends upon a tripartite 
model. It is not, by contrast, two and a half branches, or two and a third 
branches.  To vindicate its role as a full and functional agent, the judiciary 
must be rendered more than a rubber stamp, particularly in those matters, 
such as takings, that implicate a mix of individual and collective interests.  
A meaningful model of judicial review must be allowed to accommodate 
the independence, certainly, but also the interdependence of the coordinat-
ing branches.  Courts must be willing to engage those branches in an ex-
change that demands a better modicum of accountability.  Until then, the 
public trust remains vulnerable. 
